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THE SENTENCING OF WHITE-COLLAR
CRIMINALS IN FEDERAL COURTS: A
SOCIO-LEGAL EXPLORATION OF
DISPARITYt
Ilene H. Nagel*
'John L. Hagan**
As early as 1939, the perception of white-collar crime as a na-
tional problem had emerged. Edwin Sutherland, for example, com-
pared the crime and punishment of the white-collar class, composed
of respected businessmen and professionals, with that of the lower
class.' His work, which he viewed less as a call for policy reform
than as a contribution to theoretical criminology, stimulated suc-
ceeding decades of research. A consistent theme, whether stated ex-
plicitly or implicitly, runs through this body of research: laws and
sanctions are differentially applied, to the benefit of the white-collar
offender. 2 Sutherland argued that this differential treatment did not
reflect important distinctions between the types of offenses commit-
ted by the two classes.3 Rather, he emphasized that the disparate
t Funds for this research were provided by a grant to the authors from the National
Institute of Mental Health, Crime & Delinquency Section.
The authors wish to express gratitude to Sheldon Plager, Chris Stone, Gil Geiss, and Bill
Popkin for their comments on an earlier draft. Thanks are extended to Celesta Albonetti for
her assistance with the data analyses, and to Larry Zimmerman, Ida Warren and Barbara
McAdam for their research assistance.
* Associate Professor of Law and Sociology, Indiana University (Bloomington) School of
Law. M.A., 1973; Ph.D. 1974, N.Y.U. - Ed.,
** Professor of Sociolog and Law, University of Toronto. Ph.D. 1974, University of
Alberta. - Ed.
1. See Sutherland, White-Collar Criminality, in WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 38 (G. Geis & R.
Meier rev. ed. 1977).
2. See, e.g., W. CHAMBLISS, CRIMINAL LAW IN ACTION (1975); R. HOOD & R. SPARKS,
KEY ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY (1970); Cressey, Crime in CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS
136 (R. Merton & R. Nisbet eds. 1966); Green, Race, Social Status, and Criminal Arrest, 35
AM. Soc. REv. 476 (1970); Tittle & Villemez, Social Class and Criminality, 56 Soc. FORCES
474 (1977).
3. According to Sutherland, white-collar crimes in business and the professions consist
principally of violation of delegated or implied trust. Many of them can be reduced to two
categories:
(1) misrepresentation of asset values and (2) duplicity in the manipulation of power. White-
collar criminality in business might include misrepresentation in financial statements of corpo-
rations, manipulation in the stock exchange, commercial bribery, bribery of public officials
directly or indirectly in order to secure favorable contracts and legislation, misrepresentation
in advertising and salesmanship, embezzlement and misapplication of funds, tax frauds, and
misapplication of funds in receiverships and bankruptcies. White-collar crime in the profes-
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treatment of white-collar and common criminals reflected differences
among offenders and in the administration of criminal justice. While
most researchers presume that this pattern of differential treatment
accurately models social realities of the 1930s, the factual premise of
its continued applicability poses an unanswered question.
This Article addresses that question by examining judicial sen-
tencing philosophy as applied to white-collar criminality and report-
ing data that illuminate the operation of that philosophy. Part I of
the Article argues that the traditional purposes and limits of criminal
sentencing may plausibly justify either disparate or comparable
sentences in cases of white-collar and common criminality. Part II
describes the obstacles to an accurate empirical inquiry into how
judges resolve these uncertainties in the theory of punishment. Part
III presents a study designed to overcome as many of these obstacles
as possible. What is most dramatic is that the resulting data do not
appear to support the oft-presumed hypothesis that judges impose
lighter sentences on high-status individuals convicted of white-collar
crimes than they impose on lower-status individuals convicted of
common crimes.4 The data, however, suggest that a significantly in-
creased emphasis on the prosecution of white-collar crimes may en-
courage sentencing disparities in favor of those convicted as a result.
These findings form the Article's conclusion and a foundation for
further research.
I. JUDICIAL SENTENCING PHILOSOPHY REGARDING WHITE-
COLLAR CRIMINALITY
Widely accepted justifications for punishing criminals include
retribution against, and specific deterrence, incapacitation, and reha-
bilitation of the offender, as well as denunciation and general deter-
rence of the offense.5 As a justification of punishment, retribution
derives from the moral conviction that those who violate society's
fundamental norms deserve to suffer painful consequences. Punish-
ment also serves the moral purpose of denouncing criminal conduct,
thus expressing society's outrage at the offense. Rehabilitation and
sions might include illegal sale of narcotics, abortion, fraudulent reports and testimony in acci-
dent cases, and the like. Sutherland, supra note 1, at 40.
4. When we discuss common crimes, we refer to such crimes as burglary, murder, assault,
rape, robbery and other "street crimes."
5. This Article defends no particular position regarding the justification for punishment.
We only note that almost all authorities adopt some combination of these purposes as the
rationale for sentencing. For example, the Model Penal Code, perhaps the most authoritative
restatement of accepted sentencing theory, provides that
(1) The Court shall deal with a person who has been convicted of a crime without impos-
ing sentence of imprisonment unless, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the
1428 [Vol. 80:1427
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specific deterrence offer the utilitarian advantage of decreasing the
probability that the offender will commit additional crimes, either
because of the fear that recurrent criminal behavior will trigger re-
current punishment or because treatment succeeds in imbuing the
offender with a sincere disinclination to antisocial activity. General
deterrence offers the same advantage of reduced crime, but on a
larger scale, for the presumed deterrent effect operates not just on the
individual punished, but on all who learn that crime may lead to
consequences severe enough to outweigh its rewards.
In addition to the empirical and moral uncertainties surrounding
them, certain fundamental principles limit the application of these
justifications. One such generally accepted principle limits the just
pursuit of these purposes to punishing only individuals who render
themselves blameworthy by committing an offense.6 A correlative
principle requires some proportional relation between the gravity of
the offense and the severity of the punishment.7 Whether out of
moral revulsion or the apprehension of entrusting excessive power to
those who control the administration of justice, contemporary
crime and the history, character and condition of the defendant, it is of the opinion that
his imprisonment is necessary for protection of the public because:
(a) There is undue risk that during the period of a suspended sentence or probation the
defendant will commit another crime; or
(b) the defendant is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided most effec-
tively by his commitment to an institution; or
(c) a lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the defendant's crime.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). "Depreciating the seriousness
of the offense" elegantly incorporates the deterrent, retributive and denunciation justifications
for punishment. Although it rejects rehabilitation as independent justification for confine-
ment, the American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal Justice largely echo these provi-
sions. See III ABA STANDARDS FOR CRUMINAL JUSTICE § 18-2.5 (1980).
For an introduction to the ethical dimensions of punishment, see generally THE PHILOSO-
PHY OF PUNIsHMENT (H. Acton ed. 1969); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY
(1968); S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND IrS PROCESSES 63-201 (2d ed. 1969).
For a general introduction to the theoretical and empirical dimensions of deterrence, see, e.g.,
J. ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE (1974); G. HAWKiNS & F. ZIMRING, DETER-
RENCE (1973). For a discussion of incapacitation, see J. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 200
(1975). Cf. Van Dine, Dinitz, & Conrad, The Incapacitation of the Dangerous Offender: A
Statistical Experiment, 14 J. REs. CR.ME & DELINQUENCY 22 (1977). For recent research on
both deterrence and incapacitation, see DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION (A. Blumstein, J.
Cohen & D. Nagin eds. 1978). The contemporary disenchantment with rehabilitation reflects
both ethical and empirical objections. For a sensitive exploration of the former, see F. ALLEN,
THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL (1981). Robert Martinson's review of the litera-
ture probably remains the most devastating example of the latter type of objection. See Mar-
tinson, What Works? - Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INTEREST 22
(1974). For a fair sample of the prior enthusiasm for rehabilitation, see R. CLARK, CRIME IN
AMERICA 212-38 (1970).
6. See, eg., H.L.A. HART, supra note 5, at 11-13; Allen, The Lawas a Path to the World, 77
MICH. L. REv. 157, 159-66 (1978).
7. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, supra note 5, at 25; A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 66-76
(1976). Imposing a penalty proportional to the offense requires some approximate determina-
tion of the gravity, ie,, blameworthiness, of the offense.
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thought about punishment refuses to accept either punishing the in-
nocent or imposing draconian sanctions for trivial offenses, whatever
short-term beneficial consequences may result. The ideal of equal-
ity, in the criminal sentencing context itself intimately connected
with the culpability principle,8 further constrains the scope ofjustifi-
able punishment.9 Since justice requires treating like cases alike,
only meaningful differences between two offenders or their offenses
can justify imposing a severe sentence on one and a lenient sentence
on the other.10 Recognizing the tremendous difficulty of satisfying
these various concerns across the wide variety of criminal convic-
tions, mainstream perspectives on punishment entrust the trial judge
with great discretion to mete out individualized justice.1 These ele-
ments of sentencing theory, concerning both the purposes and limits
of just punishment, may derive plausibly from either utilitarian or
categorical moral systems. 12
8. The equality principle requires like sentencing for like offenses and/or offenders. Deter-
mining how alike two offenses or offenders are amounts to assessing their relative blamewor-
thiness. The difficulty of identifying like cases has been noted by Hart and recently explored by
Peter Westen. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 155-67 (1961); Westen, The Empy
Idea of Equali, 95 HARv. L. REv. 537 (1982).
9. See M. FRANKEL, CIMNAL SENTENCES 10-11 (1973); H.L.A. HART, supra note 8, at
155-63. The general sympathy for the equality principle finds perhaps its clearest expression in
a standard approved by the American Bar Association:
A just sentencing system should strive to treat like cases alike; when compelling rea-
sons do require inequality between similarly situated offenders, it is important for the
appearance ofjustice that special justification be provided and that the disparity be mini-
mized ....
III ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 18-3.2(a)(iii) (1980).
10. See Ill ABA STANDARDS FOR CIMINAL JUSTICE § 18-3,2(a)(iii) (1980), supra note 9.
11. A cursory inspection of typical American criminal codes reveals the enormous varia-
tions between the minimum sentence the trial judge may impose (typically a suspended sen-
tence) and the maximum, which frequently provides for very extended terms of imprisonment.
The possibility of consecutive sentences for each count in the indictment further expands judi-
cial discretion. See M. Frankel, supra note 9, at 8 ("sentencing powers of the judges are, in
short, so far unconfined that, except for frequently monstrous maximum limits, they are effec-
tively subject to no law at all"). The Supreme Court has endorsed the rationale of this
discretion:
Undoubtedly the New York statutes emphasize a prevalent modem philosophy of pe-
nology that the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime. The belief
no longer prevails that every offense in a like legal cate ory calls for an identical punish-
ment without regard to the past life and habits of a partular offender. This whoe coun-
try has traveled far from the period in which the death sentence was an automatic and
commonplace result of convictions - even for offenses today deemed trivial. Today's
philosophy of individualizing sentences makes sharp distinctions for example between
first and repeated offenders. Indeterminate sentences the ultimate termination of which
are sometimes decided by nonjudicial agencies have to a large extent taken the place of
the old rigidly fixed punishments. The practice of probation which relies heavily on non-
judicial implementation has been accepted as a wise policy. Execution of the United
States parole system rests on the discretion of an administrative parole board. Retribution
is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of
offenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence.
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247-48 (1949) (citations omitted).
12. At a sufficiently deep level of rule-utilitarian abstraction, almost any categorical norm
1430 [Vol. 80:1427
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These theoretical strands in the gestalt phenomenon of criminal
sentencing suggest that each sentencing decision requires "a compro-
mise between distinct and partly conflicting principles." 13  These
principles conflict "nowhere more often than in white-c6llar
cases."14 Consequently, mainstream sentencing theory neither re-
quires nor precludes disparate sentencing for white-collar and non-
white-collar cases.15 Trial judges must therefore reach white-:collar
sentencing decisions according to their own lights. This discretion
follows from both the broadly ethical and narrowly utilitarian
dimensions of the conventional rationale of sentencing.
A. Moral Dilemmas in White-Collar Sentencing
Throughout the mainstream rationale of punishment runs a seri-
ous tension between the social interest in punishing the offense and
the concern flowing from individualized justice for the particular of-
fender.'6 The tension becomes especially acute in the context of
white-collar criminality.1 7 This dichotomy offers profitable insights
into both of the major moral challenges to the philosophy of punish-
ment posed by white-collar criminality - the need to proportion the
penalty to the culpability of each defendant, and the demand for
equality in sentencing.
may be justified by utilitarian reasoning. For example, while punishing even the innocent
arguably might exert a net-happiness-producing deterrent effect on potential wrongdoers, com-
pelling utilitarian concerns weigh against such an institution, such as the risk that such a sys-
tem would break down in the face of popular revulsion. See, e.g., Lyons, Deterrent Theory and
Punishment of the Innocent, 83 ETHics 346 (1974).
13. H.L.A. HART, supra note 5, at 1.
14. Linman, The Paper Label Sentences: Critiques, 86 YALE L.J. 619, 619 (1977).
15. A sense of the sentencing judge's dilemma in the light of the foregoing analysis
emerges from a comparison of the justification of leniency offered in Renfrew, The Paper La-
bel Sentences: 4n Evaluation, 86 YALE L.J. 590 (1977), with the rationale of Browder v.
United States, 398 F. Supp. 1042, 1046-47 (D. Ore. 1975) (upholding 25-year prison sentence
for pledging stolen securities).
16. Punishment imposed for general deterrent purposes, for example, serves the social in-
terest in preventing crime regardless of the convicted individual's particular circumstances.
See, eg., G. HAwKiNS '& F. ZimrING, supra note 5, at 38-42 ("why should [the convict's] grief
pay for [others'] moral education?").
17. See, eg., United States v. Alton Box Board Co., [1977] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61, 336 at
71,166
[W]hen imprisonment is, as Dr. Menninger has stated, to make an example of an offender
so as to discourage others from criminal acts, then we make a defendant suffer not for
what he only has done but because of other people's tendencies.);
United States v. Braun, 382 F. Supp. 214, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
[I]t remains a source of queasiness to realize that deterrence means "making examples" of
people (despite the moral and philosophic questions that raises); that our relatively anony-
mous defendant adds at most to a mass of indistinguishable examples. . .. );
Linman, supra note 14, at 619; Pelaez, Of Crime - and Punishment. Sentencing the White-
Collar Criminal, 18 DuQ. L. REv. 823, 835 (1980) ("deterrence is a societal benefit not at all
related to the need to punish the individual wrongdoer").
1431June 1982]
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Retributivist justifications for punishment have far less difficulty
in identifying offenders as morally deserving of punishment than in
specifying the precise degree of punishment necessary to expiate the
malefactor's guilt and express society's outrage at the crime. 18 If so-
cial harm alone measures the blameworthiness of an offense, certain
white-collar offenses surely deserve more severe punishment than
any street crime. 19 If the sentencing court looks to the cumulative
blameworthiness of individual defendants, however, the white-collar
offender may point to a lifetime of social productivity to weigh
against his first transgression.20 Conversely, the privileged position
of these offenders suggests that their decision to violate the law con-
stitutes a more deeply reprehensible betrayal of social norms than
does the illegal behavior of the ignorant or impoverished. 2' On the
other side of the equation, the privileged status of white-collar of-
fenders renders identical punishments, measured by lost happiness,
more onerous for them than for less privileged defendants.22 And
18. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, supra note 5, at 25 (The proportional scale of blameworthiness
"draws rough distinctions like that between parking offenses and homicide ... but cannot
cope with any precise assessment of an individual's wickedness in committing a crime. (Who
can?)"); A. VoN HiRscH, supra note 7, at 79-83.
19. See Harris & Dunbaugh, Premisesfor a Sensible Sentencing Debate: Giving Up Imprls-
onment, 7 HOFSTRA L. REv. 417, 437 (1978) ("although the criminal justice system largely
ignores business crime, the direct short-term economic impact of this type of crime is at least
ten times greater than that attributable to 'street crime' against property, and it frequently
results in serious bodily harm"); Ogren, The Ineffectiveness of the Crninal Sanction in Fraud
and Corruption Cases: Losing the Battle Against Wite-Collar Crime, I AM. CraM. L. Rlv.
959, 965 (1973) ("Some white-collar crimes may be more vicious, calculated and exploitive
than street crimes, which are penalized far more severely"); Pelaez, supra note 17, at 823 ("The
most notorious street criminals did not approach white-collar criminals in either the magni-
tude of their crimes, or the human carnage left in their wake.").
20. United States v. Paterno, 375 F. Supp. 647 (S.D.N.Y.), affd., 798 F.2d 1396 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1106 (1975), involved fairly typical facts:
The defendants .. , have led exemplary lives.... They have built stable families
and a stable business. People of distinction and more humble workers in their enterprise
write letters of sincere praise, devotion, and appreciation on their behalf. The defendants
have not been ungenerous in dealing with friends, employees, family members, and chari-
table agencies. It may be predicted with reasonable confidence that neither defendant will
ever run afoul of the law again. The fall from untarnished eminence in their communities
has been an irreparably grievous blow. The defendants, in the frequently heard but still
pertinent appeal, "have been punished enough already." It is urged earnestly that a sen-
tence of imprisonment would serve ends only of vengeance.
375 F. Supp. 647, 648. In spite of sensitivity to these concerns, Judge Frankel imposed brief
prison sentences in the case.
21. "I cannot reconcile a policy of sending poorly educated burglars from the ghetto to jail
when men in the highest positions of public trust and authority receive judicial coddling when
they are caught fleecing their constituencies .... " United States v. Browder, 398 F. Supp.
1042, 1046 (D. Or. 1975), affd., 544 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1976).
22. See, eg., Mann, Wheeler & Sarat, Sentencing the Mite Collar Offender, 17 AM. CriM.
L. REv. 479, 483-84 ("Most judges share a widespread belief that the suffering experienced by
a white-collar person as a result of apprehension, public indictment, and conviction, and the
collateral disabilities incident to conviction - loss of job, professional licenses, and status in
the community - completely satisfies the need to punish the individual."); Pelaez, supra note
1432 [Vol. 80:1427
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even in the age of its renaissance, many will view retribution beyond
narrowly utilitarian parameters as mere revenge. 23
Given these ambiguities and paradoxes, examples of very differ-
ent sentences for similar white-collar cases should occasion small
surprise.24 Even a Dworkinian Hercules would have great difficulty
in "correctly" sorting out these competing concerns to fashion an ap-
propriate sentence. In such cases, mortal judges have little on which
to rely but experience and intuition.
Whether responding to the blameworthiness conundrum with a
severe or lenient sentence, the judge likely will confront the moral
demand for equality in sentencing. If stem, the sentence will pro-
voke the defense to comparisons with prior lenient sentences for sim-
ilar defendants. 25 If merciful, observers will condemn the unjust
17, at 842 ("Punishment is a subjective thing, and the extent of the punishment differs with
regard to the sensitivity to a particular punishment of the person we seek to punish.").
23. See Mann, Wheeler & Sarat, supra note 22, at 482-86 (arguing the nearly exclusive role
of general deterrence in motivating judges to incarcerate white-collar offenders); Pelaez, supra
note 17, at 841-44, 844 ("Punishment for the sake of punishment should be resorted to, if at all,
only when no constructive alternatives are available."). See also United States v. Braun, 382
F. Supp. 214, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1974):
The defendant before us,. . . is a man of 35. He has no prior criminal record. He is
talented, gainfully employed, earnest in the discharge of family obligations, and entitled
to hope for a bright, if unsung future. He needs no "rehabilitation" our prisons can offer.
The likelihood that he will transgress again is as close to nil as we are ever able to predict.
Vengeance, the greatest text tells us, is not for mortal judges ....
24. See, e.g., note 15, supra.
25. It is not uncommon for white-collar offenders to point to past practices of leniency for
other white-collar offenders, either as a justification for a sentence other than imprisonment in
their own case, or as a rationale for an appeal and a motion to reduce the sentence as initially
meted out. In United States V. Browder, supra note 21, the petitioner challenged the sentence
imposed on the grounds that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment and denied the peti-
tioner equal protection of the law:
The basis for petitioner's claim is a study he conducted of 100 cases involving similar
white-collar crimes. . . . Of the 100 defendants studied, 20% received fines, probation, or
suspended sentences only for acts involving $350,000,000 or more. The others studied
received light sentences for a variety of swindles in which the public became victim to
members of the Mafia. . . and others ....
398 F. Supp. at 1046. Similarly, in United States v. Alton Box Board Co., (1964) Trade Cas.
(CCH) 71,163, a memorandum was submitted to the Court, on behalf of the defendants,
arguing:
In numerous other price-fixing cases of equal or greater magnitude, some involving more
aggravated circumstances than alleged in this indictment, no jail sentences were imposed.
(1964) Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,163 at app. II n.2 § IB. In United States v. Prince, 533 F.2d 205
(7th Cir. 1976), defendants sought to withdraw their pleas of nolo contendere on the grounds
that they had relied on their counsel's computations "that in 93% of the antitrust cases in which
the defendants plead nolo, the resulting fines were minimal and no actual imprisonment re-
sulted." 532 F.2d at 207. And, in United States v. Kahn, 367 F. Supp. 959, 960 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), a motion to reduce a sentence of five years imprisonment was considered by Judge
Motley, in view of a survey of sentencing disparities in the Southern District of New York:
[A] survey made by the United States Attorney for this District revealed that there
appears to be disparities [sic] in sentencing in this court between different classes of de-
fendants. More specifically it appeared that whitecollar criminals are dealt with more leni-
ently than non-whitecollar criminals convicted of crimes which did not involve the use of
violences. But it further appeared from the survey that the sentence given to Mr. Kahn
1434 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 80:1427
solicitude for the offender's social rank or choice of criminal meth-
ods.26 Like the blameworthiness issue, these demands suggest no
clear resolution. Again, exploring the offender/offense dichotomy
offers useful insights.
The broadest and most compelling version of the equality claim
argues that justice requires the like treatment of like cases. 27 The
equality argument for severe punishment of upper-class perpetrators
of white-collar crimes focuses on the offense. Equally criminal acts
was substantially greater than the average sentence given to so called whitecollar
criminals and, more particularly, to persons convicted of bribery and perjury in this Dis-
trict and somewhat greater than the national averages for these crimes. In view of the
foregoing, it appeared to the court that this latter fact might be a basis for reduction of
sentence.
Perhaps the stongest such comparison occurred in United States v. Braun, 382 F. Supp. 214
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), where Judge Frankel suspended the initial prison sentence he imposed. He
did so, however, for political considerations not necessarily relevant to all historical periods.
The defendant had been sentenced to a short term of imprisonment plus a fine on a plea of
guilty to charges of attempting to evade the paying of federal income taxes. On motion for
reconsideration of sentence, Judge Frankel recited the standard litany for leniency in white-
collar cases, and coupled this with a comparison of the defendant's sentence with the pardon of
former President Nixon that occurred four days after the initial sentencing pronouncement.
Judge Frankel said:
But how do we reconcile the application of these factors to our unknown defendant
with the pardon granted last Sunday? In the case at bar, the defendant's crime may have
involved as much as $22,000 or as little as $2500 in evaded taxes. The alleged crimes
embraced by the recent pardon may have included among the lesser items tax evasion to
the extent of several hundreds of thousands of dollars ...
The court concludes that in the particular case at bar, at this particular time, the prison
sentence cannot justly be executed.
382 F. Supp. at 215-17.
In addition to white-collar criminals making reference to the practice of preferential treat-
ment, nonwhite-collar criminals, on occasion, make reference to the same practice for similar
purposes. In United States v. Rodriguez, 496 F. Supp. at 930 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), the defendant
filed a motion for a reduction of sentence on the ground that Judge Brieant, in an unrelated
case, sentenced a white-collar offender to a fine, whereas Rodriguez was sentenced to 18
months incarceration. In a supplemental submission to the court, counsel for the defendant
argued.
I fervently believe that equality under the law invites comparison.. . . Your Honor
saw fit to sentence that captain of commerce to a mere fine, and a suspended jail term of
one year ... My client Mr. Rodriguez, a modest Puerto Rican mailman. . . submitted
no such testimonials [of his virtues as a civic leader].
While the Court held that "disparity in sentences has always been a troublesome business
for the community to understand," the motion for sentence reduction was denied. 496 F.
Supp. at 931. One justification for the denial was a misrepresentation of the facts in the related
case as presented in the memorandum by Rodriguez' counsel. See United States v. Rodriguez,
496 F. Supp. 930, 931 n.l.
26. "The most frequently heard indictment of the handling of white-collar criminals is that
they are not often enough incarcerated and, when sentenced to imprisonment, the terms are far
too short." Pelaez, supra note 17, at 829. See United States v. Blitstein, 626 F.2d 774, 780
(10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 898 (1981); United States v. Egan, 459 F.2d 997, 998
(2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Paterno, 375 F. Supp. 647, 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); United States
v. Bengimina, [1971] Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,474, at 89,925; United States v. National Dairy
Prods. Corp., [1964] Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,163. See also United States v. Browder, supra
note 21, at 1046.
27. See notes 8-9, supra.
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of like social harm, the argument goes, merit like punishment.28
This contention begs two questions. The classification of white-col-
lar and street crimes as "like" assumes the conclusion to the culpa-
bility problem outlined above.29 If the white-collar crimes of upper-
class individuals deserve less blame than the common crimes of
lower-class individuals, the same sentence in the two cases will not
qualify as like punishment. The categorization of identical sentences
as likepunishment depends on the further assumption that all indi-
viduals experience punishment in the same way.30 If upper-class
criminals suffer more severely from a prison sentence than lower-
class criminals, like punishment would require leniency for the up-
per-class defendant. These assumptions about crime and punish-
ment cannot be verified independently. Yet such assumptions inhere
in any moral argument predicated on equality.31
The equality argument for leniency focuses on the offender. The
defense points out prior lenient sentences for white-collar offenders
and claims the right to like treatment. This argument suffers from
two weaknesses. If prior leniency followed from a mistaken or obso-
lete culpability calculus, the cases are not in fact alike.32 If white-
collar and common criminals deserve equal punishment, the prior
injustice of failing to recognize this principle should not preclude the
courts from correcting that mistake. Errors in the exercise ofjudicial
discretion cannot justify their own perpetuation. More pointedly,
enough white-collar offenders have been incarcerated by now to
make "like treatment for like cases" a risky argument for the de-
fense. Thus, neither argument for sentencing equality, nor the
28. See note 26, supra.
29. See notes 18-23, supra, and accompanying text. If white-collar offenders deserve less
blame for their behavior than other criminals deserve for theirs, disparate sentences would not
offend the equality principle.
30. See note 22, supra. Pelaez makes the, point clearly:
Much is made of the fact that punishments must be equal - that it is somehow unfair to
sentence one person who commits a crime to a term of imprisonment and another to an
alternative nonimprisonment sanction. However, punishment can never be equal. To
some, a year in jail is no big deal; to others, it is a horrendous punishment that may drive
the recipient to or over the suicidal brink. To say that sentencing each of those very
different felons to one year in prison is to punish them equally ignores reality. Equal
sentences have nothing to do with equal punishment and everything to do with providing
only the outward appearance of equal punishment. Punishment is a subjective thing, and
the extent of the punishment differs with regard to the sensitivity to a particular punish-
ment of the person we seek to punish.
Pelaez, supra note 17, at 842-43.
31. See Westen, note 8, supra.
32. "The defect in [defendant's] argument is his conclusion that because other white-collar
criminals have been receiving disparate treatment, he should too." United States v. Browder,
398 F. Supp. at 1046.
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blameworthiness calculus that they ultimately depend on, does much
to guide the trial judge.
B. Policy Dilemmas in White- Collar Sentencing
The central policy issue in white-collar sentencing concerns gen-
eral deterrence, for incapacitation, rehabilitation and specific deter-
rence ordinarily fail to justify incarceration in such cases. 33 Given
that, due to the lack of both inclination and opportunity, most white-
collar defendants present little risk of recidivism, the policy focus in
sentencing such offenders turns to general prevention. The general
deterrence issue pits the suffering spared the offender by leniency
against the suffering inflicted on society by future offenses that leni-
ency might fail to deter.3 4 The result of this calculus turns on a broad
array of imponderables.
The calculated planning of white-collar offenses suggests their
comparative susceptibility to general deterrence.35 The magnitude
of social harm such crimes inflict further bolsters the case for deter-
rence.36 But disagreement arises as to whether deterrence requires
imprisonment for maximum success.37 Nor can judges ignore, or
precisely weigh, the cost of excessive incarceration in human degra-
dation and lost potential.38
Thus, neither the moral nor the pragmatic elements in the current
orthodox view of criminal sentencing offers clear implications for
33. See, e.g, Mann, Wheeler & Sarat, supra note 22, at 482-86; Pelaez, supra note 17, at
829-44; Renfrew, supra note 15, at 542.
34. See note 17 supra.
35. See, eg., United States v. Kahn, 367 F. Supp. 959, 961 (S.D.N.Y. 1973):
[Tihe bribery scheme was carefully planned and elaborately executed. It was not a
thoughtless, spur of the moment, criminal act. Consequently, the societal interest in deter-
ring such criminal activity was made manifest in this case, and the need for an effective
deterrent by the imposition of a substantial prison sentence was clear ....
36. From a utilitarian standpoint, the more unhappiness spared society by the deterrent
impact of punishment, the more unhappiness may be ethically inflicted to secure the preven-
tive result. See note 19 supra.
37. Compare United States v. Nu-Phonics, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 1007, 1014-15 (E.D. Mich.
1977) (quoting a report of the Committee on Economic Crime of the ABA Section on Criminal
Justice) ("the most effective punishment for the economic crime offender is incarceration
.... "); Coffee, Corporate Crime and Punhment: 4 Non-Chicago View of the Economics of
Criminal Sanctions, 17 AM. CRiM. L. Rv. 419 (1980), with Pelaez, supra note 17, at 845-54;
Posner, Optimal Sentences/or White-Collar Criminals, 17 AM. CRiM. L. Rav. 409 (1980); Ren-
frew, supra note 15.
38. See Pelaez, supra note 17, at 829-32. Bentham's concern for the unhappiness inflicted
by punishment is especially relevant here: "[A]lthough it has been too frequently forgotten,
... the delinquent is a member of the community, as well as any other individual. . . and
... there is just as much reason for consulting his interest as any other. His welfare is propor-
tionately the welfare of the community - his suffering the suffering of the community." 1 J.
BENTHAM, WoRKs 398 (1843).
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sentencing white-collar criminals. Morally, the absolute or even
comparative blameworthiness of the white-collar offender eludes
easy determination. Pragmatically, identifying the minimum degree
of pain necessary to achieve acceptable levels of general deterrence
of white-collar offenses involves comparable difficulty. In combina-
tion, these ethical and practical uncertainties locate the white-collar
sentencing Uecision deep in a gray area far beyond the easy condem-
nation of the crimes themselves. Contemporary research into white-
collar criminality has taken the resolution of these uncertainties as
one of its objectives.
C. Summary: Recurring Tension and the Need
for Empirical Study
Three recurring value conflicts appear throughout the foregoing
discussion. First, the principle of equality competes with the princi-
ple of individualized sentencing. Our system is based on a funda-
mental belief in the benefit of judicial discretion, especially as it
relates to the tailoring of individual sentences to individual offend-
ers. Yet an equally important value - the treating of like cases alike
- constrains judicial discretion. Defining equality, however, poses
obvious problems. Moreover, assuming that equality could be de-
fined, no equation yet put forth accounts for all of the differentials
between white-collar criminality and nonwhite-collar criminality.
Thus it is no surprise that judges continue to vacillate between the
variety of positions reviewed, that judicial views do not always coin-
cide with public judgments as to the severity of sentencing out-
comes, -and that the philosophy of sentencing, especially as it relates
to white-collar criminality, continues to be a hotly debated issue.
Second, an underlying tension inheres in all discussions about
sentencing purposes. Discussions about white-collar criminality ex-
acerbate these tensions because the justification for harsh sentences
sometimes differs from the justification for similar harsh sentences
for nonwhite-collar criminality. Stating the case in somewhat sim-
plistic terms, for nonwhite-collar criminals the most oft-cited justifi-
cations for a sentence of imprisonment include specific deterrence,
incapacitation, or punishment. Little faith seems to remain in the
proposition that prisons serve a rehabilitative function. These rea-
sons, however, all relate to the behavior of the convicted offender
and predictive judgments about the effect of the sentence on his or
her future behavior. For white-collar criminals, the primary justifi-
cation for imprisonment is general deterrence, perhaps regardless of
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the effect the sentence will have on the particular offender who
serves it.
Third, there is the seemingly insoluble problem of separating the
dancer from the dance. If the sentence responds to the offense, argu-
ments can be made for considerations of general deterrence and the
need for public denunciation of a serious offense. If, however, the
sentence responds to the offender, consideration of his or her hereto-
fore exemplary life leads almost inevitably to the debate as to
whether this otherwise unblemished record should serve to mitigate
the sentence, or whether this privileged position in society, free from
the burdens of poverty, should serve to underscore even more the
inexcusability of the criminal act.
Given the inherent ambiguities and contradictions of sentencing
theory, empirical study of white-collar sentencing offers significant
potential for clarifying these uncertainties. Critics cannot debate sen-
tencing discretion with much intelligence until they know how
judges exercise it. Such knowledge could contribute by itself to the
debate on sentencing, by revealing how judges trained to the task
and possessed of the facts tend to resolve the dilemmas they con-
front. Numerous obstacles, however, restrict the potential of such a
study. The next section addresses these challenges.
II. INHERENT PROBLEMS OF COMPARISON RESEARCH ON
WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALITY
Various difficulties limit the potential for empirical research
comparing the punishment meted out to white-collar offenders with
that meted out to those found guilty of traditional or common
crimes. 39 These include definitional, methodological, technical and
political problems. While none of these challenges raises an insur-
mountable barrier to meaningful research, each deserves close
examination.
A. Definitional Problems
Despite the fact that Sutherland, in inaugurating the concept,
went to great lengths to define white-collar crime,40 both through
elaboration and by example, debate continues as to the proper defi-
nition of the term.41 In 1978, the Ninety-fifth Congress held hear-
39. See note 4, supra.
40. See E. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME (1949).
41. See, eg., A. BEQUAI, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A 20TH-CENTURY CRIsIs 1, 11 (1978);
A. REIss & A. BIDERMAN, DATA SOURCES ON WHITE-COLLAR LAw-BREAKING 4 (1980).
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ings before the Subcommittee on Crime on the Committee of the
Judiciary in the House of Representatives, and introduced the ses-
sion on white-collar crime by seeking to define the terms.42 In 1980,
the United States Department of Justice introduced a comprehensive
bibliography on white-collar crime by stating that "It]here is no uni-
versally accepted definition of white-collar crime." 43 Clearly there
remains uAcertainty and lack of agreement about what the rubric of
white-collar crime properly includes. The fact that persons of lower
socioecomonic background commit many of the offenses tradition-
idly thought to be white-collar compounds the problem. Tax eva-
sion, for example, while meeting the definitional criterion of an
economic crime, may or may not be committed pursuant to a profes-
sion or by persons of high social status. Moreover, not all white-
collar criminals commit white-collar offenses. While the cases of
Jean Harris or Patty Hearst represent the celebrated exceptions,44
they do not stand alone in the category of white-collar offenders.
The relevance of these definitional problems is that the particular
definition of white-collar used to determine sample inclusion very
much affects research seeking to compare the sanctioning of white-
collar offenders to that of nonwhite-collar offenders. Two recent
studies of the sentencing of white-collar offenders,45 for example,
arrive at somewhat divergent conclusions. Yet a close examination
of the offenses included by each in the category of white-collar 46
42. White-Collar Crime: The Problem and The Federal Response, Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Crime of the House Comm on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978).
43. Id, atv.
44. See, eg., Hearst v. United States, 563 F.2d 1331 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000
(1978).
45. Hagan, Nagel & Albonetti, The Dfi2erential Sentencing of White-Collar Offenders in Ten
Federal District Courts, 45 AM. Soc. Rnv. 802 (1980); S. Wheeler, D. Weisburd & N. Bode,
Sentencing the White-Collar Offender: Rhetoric and Reality (1981) (unpublished manuscript
from Yale Law School) (copy on file with the Michigan Law Review).
46. See Hagen, Nagel & Albonetti, supra note 45, at 80 n.6; Wheeler, Weisburd & Bode,
supra note 45, at 4 n.4. The following offenses are included in the former study but not the
latter 18 U.S.C §§ 152, 209, 286, 643, 648, 657, 658, 664, 1342 (1976) (bankruptcy - conceal-
ment of assets, false oaths and claims, bribery; bribery, graft, and conflict of interest - salary
of government officials and employees payable only by U.S.; claims and services in matters
affecting government - conspiracy to defraud the government with respect to claims; embez-
zlement and theft - accounting for public money; embezzlement and theft - custodians,
generally, misusing public funds; embezzlement and theft - lending, credit and insurance
institutions; embezzlement and theft - property mortgaged or pledged to farm credit agencies,
embezzlement and theft - theft or embezzlement from employee benefit plan; mail fraud -
fictitious name or address; respectively); 29 U.S.C. § 501 (1976) (fiduciary responsibility of
officers of labor organizations); 38 U.S.C. § 3502 (1976) (fraudulent acceptance of payments -
veteran's benefits). The following offenses are included in the latter study but not in the for-
mer- 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) (1976) (securities regulation); 18 U.S.C. §§ 495, 1708 (1976) (forgery -
false, altered or forged deed, contract, etc.; theft or receipt of stolen mail; respectively); 26
U.S.C. § 7207 (1976) (fraudulent returns, statements or other documents).
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reveals some differences in the respective sample inclusion defini-
tions. This may account, in part, for the slight differences in findings
reported.
Importantly, until researchers agree on the proper definition of
white-collar crime, especially as to whether white-collar crime in-
cludes only white-collar offenses committed by white-collar persons,
research seeking to compare sanctions meted out to white-collar
criminals to those meted out to nonwhite-collar criminals will be se-
riously limited.
B. Methodological Problems
While some methodological problems plague all research on
criminal justice outcomes47 the particular research problem at hand
presents four distinctive difficulties. First, the vast majority of white-
collar cases prosecuted and brought to the sentencing stage proceed
through the federal district courts. However, with only a few notable
exceptions, 48 the bulk of research that seeks to ascertain whether up-
per-class defendants fare better than lower-class defendants because
of their privileged background has dealt with data collected in state
courts, where middle- and upper-class defendants constitute a practi-
cal and statistical minority.49 Since social scientists only recently
have begun to work with federal court data, much of the potential
for determining whether white-collar crimes receive treatment differ-
ent from that of nonwhite-collar crimes remains more promise than
realized potential.
Second, while researchers enjoy relative ease of access to data on
sanctioning decisions for traditional criminals, they face considera-
ble difficulty in obtaining data on white-collar crimes.50 This diffi-
culty stems partly from the resolution of many disputes involving
white-collar crimes through civil litigation or administrative pro-
ceedings rather than through criminal proceedings.51 Moreover,
47. For a review of methodological problems in court research, see Presentation by 1.
Nagel & J. Hagan, Process and Outcome in the Study of Judicial Decisions: Multiple Methods
and Theoretical Transformation (May 1978) (Meeting of Law & Soc. Assn.).
48. See, e-g., Hagan & Nagel-Bernstein, The Sentence Bargaining of Upperworld and Vn-
derworld Crime in Ten FederalDistrict Courts, 13 LAW & Socy. REv. 467 (1979); Katz, Legal-
it), and Equality Plea Bargaining in the Prosecution of White-Collar and Common Crimes, 13
LAW & Socy. REv. 431 (1979); Mann, Wheeler & Sarat, Sentencing the White-Collar Offender,
17 AM. CRim. L. REv. 479 (1980); Tiffany, Avichai & Peters, A Statistical.nalyss of Sentenc-
ing in Federal Courts: Defendants ConvictedAfter Trial, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 369 (1975).
49. See, e.g., Chiricos & Waldo, Socioeconomic Status and Crminal Sentencing: An Empir-
icalAssessment of a Conflict Proposition, 40 AM. Soc. REv. 753 (1975).
50. A. BEQUAI, WHITE-COLLAR CRiME: A 20TH-CENTURY Ciusis 9 (1978).
51. Id
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many of these proceedings, or at least the outcomes of the prelimi-
nary procedural stages, are kept secret.52
Third, and very much related to the above, a substantial likeli-
hood of selection bias characterizes studies of the sentencing of
white-collar offenders. For one thing, the fact that administrative
proceedings and civil remedies exist as viable alternatives to criminal
prosecution may mean that the less egregious offenses and the higher
status offenders may never face criminal charges. If so, those cases
in the criminal court files represent a biased sample of offenses and
offenders. The possibility that the existence of corporate codefend-
ants may lead to greater administrative and judicial sympathy for
individual white-collar defendants introduces yet another possible
source of selection bias.53 Furthermore, findings of differences in
studies of sentencing merit considerable caution because sentencing
decisions are the outcome of a process with numerous early screen-
ing decisions. Studies of the prosecution of white-collar cases54 have
presented data to support the thesis that pre-sentencing screening
pervades white-collar cases in particular. Since white-collar prose-
cutions involve persons of distinction, and since prosecution itself
can severely damage a person's reputation, the pre-indictment inves-
tigation tends to be more lengthy and more complete than the pre-
indictment investigation of more traditional crimes. This suggests
that prosecutors may pursue only those cases characterized by strong
evidence and likely convictions. Since white-collar cases often in-
volve complex litigation and the use of potential defendants willing
to turn state's evidence as witnesses, the likelihood increases that
only the most culpable in multi-defendant cases will reach the adju-
dication decision stage. The government will likely reward others
for their cooperation with some form of pre-adjudication diversion.55
This greater potential for selection bias suggests that those white-
collar cases that appear in the sentencing files may reflect only the
most culpable white-collar cases. If the bias operates in the direction
we expect, ie., that only the best cases against the most egregious
offenders of lesser status come to the sentencing stage, we also
52. Id
53. See Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90
YALE LJ. 1, 13 (1980).
54. See, ag., Hagan & Nagel-Bemstein, The Sentence Bargaining of Upperworld and Un-
derworld Crime in Ten Federal District Courts, 13 LAW & Soc. REv. 467 (1979); Katz, Legaity
andEquality: Plea Bargaining in the Prosecution of White-Collar and Common Crimes, 13 LAw
& Soc. REv. 431 (1979).
55. Hagan & Nagel-Berstein, The Sentencing Bargaining of Upperworld and Underworld
Crime in Ten Federal District Courts, 13 LAW & Soc. Rav. 467 (1979).
1441June 1982]
Michigan Law Review
should expect smaller rather than larger differences among the
sentences for white-collar criminals and nonwhite-collar criminals.
Finally, variations in measurement procedures and in the con-
texts in which sentencing is observed present methodological
problems. With respect to measurement, comparisons of sentences
will prove meaningful only if the analyses measure sentence severity
in the same or comparable ways, and if they include the same vari-
ables, apart from the white-collar nature of the offense and the of-
fender. With respect to variation in context, sentencing, like other
criminal justice outcome decisions, responds to changes in public
opinion, changes in historical periods, political philosophy, and the
priorities of the judge and jurisdiction in which the government
prosecutes the case. Thus, the findings we report here cannot pre-
tend to hold for all time, or to provide the basis for comparisons
with findings reported for earlier periods in history. Ongoing dra-
matic shifts in public and private attitudes toward white-collar
crime emphasize this caveat.56 Whereas the Carter Administration
heralded the prosecution of white-collar crime as a public priority,57
the early statements of representatives of the Reagan Administration
seem not so inclined to make crime in the suites a national priority.
In sum, the problems associated with having large samples of white-
collar cases to compare to nonwhite-collar cases, gaining access to
these case proceedings, early selection biases, and variation in mea-
surement procedures and research context, all contribute to make the
methodological problems of this kind of research serious and
substantial.
C. Technical Problems
White-collar cases may also differ from nonwhite-collar cases in
their manner of prosecution. A federal investigative office in Wash-
ington pre-screens a substantial number of white-collar cases before
the local United States Attorney's office reaches a final decision to
prosecute. This procedure frequently governs cases involving al-
leged violations of the tax laws and cases alleging criminal violation
56. Project, ;ite-Collar Crim. Second,4nnual Survey of Law, 19 AM. CRiM. L. Rav. 266
n.757 (1981) (indicating wide historical variations in the intensity of prosecution of white-
collar crime).
57. Id Moreover, as part of the research on which we here report, we collected interview
data from United States Attorneys and Assistant United States Attorneys in the ten districts in
which we conducted our research. Interview data were collected in the Fall of 1977 and Spring
of 1978. In all ten jurisdictions, the perception of the United States Attorneys was that the
prosecution of white-collar criminality was a major priority.
1442 [Vol. 80:1427
Sentencing White-Collar Criminals
by public officials.5 8 Moreover, the national rather than local inter-
est in some of these cases sometimes leads the United States Depart-
ment of Justice to send specially experienced litigators to the local
district offices of United States Attorneys to take responsibility for
these cases. The practice of sending federal prosecutors with special-
ized experience seems particularly common in cases alleging viola-
tions of antitrust statutes. Finally, in cases involving multiple
defendants drawn from multiple jurisdictions, the Department of
Justice often selects the particular jurisdiction in which the cases will
be brought. To the extent that these technical differences involve a
more careful pre-selection of cases, greater pre-indictment investiga-
tory work, the use of more experienced prosecutors, and a more con-
certed interest in case outcomes, the conviction and sentencing
decisions that follow may differ from those that follow less intense
prosecutorial efforts.
D. Political Problems
Addressing the question of whether white-collar criminals re-
ceive preferential treatment in sentencing decisions because of their
privileged background confronts head-on the issue of equality.60
Equality, however, conflicts with the view that crime should fit the
offender, not the offense. Merely raising this issue may risk political
unpopularity. This may partially explain why researchers have for
so long shied away from direct comparisons. Additionally, the feel-
ing persists, at least on the part of some, that white-collar offenses
really do not amount to crimes, but rather reflect a natural extension
58. In interviewing United States Attorneys and their assistants, we were repeatedly told
that allegations concerning tax violations as well as those alleging misconduct by public offi-
cials were cleared first, respectively, by the Internal Revenue Service and by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice.
59. For example, according to our interview data, one district was deliberately chosen as
the jurisdiction in which to prosecute a major antitrust case.
In response to our question - why was this district the chosen site for the prosecution -
our interviewees stated the following:
[1] [The U.S. Attorney] made the pursuit of official corruption and white-collar crime a
priority....
[2] We had a better relationship... with the Strike Force .... This accounted for more
leads to white-collar crime....
[3] Postal inspectors here are more receptive to helping investigators...
[4] Our United States Attorney's Office had a professional prosecutor who was independ-
ent and a white-collar crime prosecutor.
The thrust of the comments was that this district was chosen because its attorneys could be
expected to do a highly professional job on the prosecution. Moreover, it was thought that the
Judiciary had an attitude of "trust busterism". The combination of presumed sympathy of the
prosecutor and the judiciary for the government's case allegedly led to the selection of the
district for the price-fixing prosecution.
60. M. FRAN.K, CumwAr. SENTENcEs 10 (1973).
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of our competitive economic structure.61 Finally, dating back to
when Sutherland first raised the issue, there exists a guardedness in
executing research whose results may contribute to a policy reform
that would thereafter deny the upper class an advantage to which
they have become accustomed. Sutherland handled the problem by
limiting his stated interest to academic criminology. 62 Bequai forth-
rightly denounces this guardedness as deference to the political and
economic power structure.63 Scholars may detach themselves from
such political labels only with difficulty. To the extent that ideolo-
gies impose themselves on the results of sentencing studies, they
present an additional obstacle to research of this kind.
To summarize, definitional, methodological, technical, and polit-
ical problems all limit comparative research on sentencing. These
limits serve not to dissuade us from moving forward with the task,
but rather to sensitize us to the preliminary nature of any reported
results, and to affect, in part, the way we design our research.
1I. DATA ON THE SENTENCING OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS
IN TEN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS
A. Data Collection and Distribution Among Districts
The quantitative data we analyze in this paper involve 6,518 of-
fenders sentenced over a period beginning in 1974 and ending in
1977. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts col-
lected these records and premised our use of them on an agreement
not to identify individual districts in our analyses.64 Collectively, the
ten districts and their principal cities include: Eastern and Southern
New York (Brooklyn and Manhattan), Northern Illinois (Chicago),
61. See Geis, The Heavy ElectricaEqu#?ment4ntitrust Cases of 1961, in WHITE-COLLAR
Cima 21 nA0 (G. GeLs & R. Meier eds. 1977).
62. "This comparison is made for the purpose of developing the theories of criminal be-
havior, not for the purpose of muckraking or of reforming anything except criminology ......
Sutherland, supra note 1 at 38.
63. The crimes of the upper classes were viewed in terms of politics rather than law.
They were the acts of an immoral ruling elite rather than the illegal acts of a strata of
society. In many instances, these ideologues were justified, for in nineteenth century Eu-
rope, the upper classes deemed themselves as being above the law. Well into the twenti-
eth century, crimes by the professional and affluent sectors of society were viewed through
a political prism. Those who attacked such acts did so along political lines; they, in turn,
were labeled Communists and Socialists ....
A. BEQUAI, supra note 50, at 7.
64. The data were collected with special provisions for quality control and comprehensive-
ness made possible through a mandate of Title II of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 to evaluate
the experimental bail reform program established under this Act. All but 88 cases (which
came into the data set in 1974) are from the years 1975 through 1977. The provisions of the
evaluation were that a population of cases was to be collected during this period. Our inter-
views in all ten districts indicated full cooperation in the fulfillment of this mandate.
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Eastern Pennsylvania (Philadelphia), Maryland (Baltimore), North-
ern Texas (Dallas), Western Missouri (Kansas City), Northern Geor-
gia (Atlanta), Central California (Los Angeles), and Eastern
Michigan (Detroit). To supplement the quantitative record data,
both authors made site visits to each district. During the site visits
we observed approximately 200 hours of court proceedings and con-
ducted approximately 600 hours of interviews with the following
court personnel: 9 Chief Judges and 42 Presiding Judges, 8 United
States Attorneys and 48 Assistant United States Attorneys, 14 Proba-
tion Officers, 15 Administrators of Pre-Trial Services Agencies, 31
Magistrates, and 10 Chiefs of Public Defender Offices.65 Before be-
ginning our analyses, we want first to return to some of the issues of
measurement and definition of white-collar crime raised above.
As indicated, although the term "white-collar crime" has gained
currency in several languages and in popular thought, disagreement
and confusion regarding its meaning continue.66 Much of the prob-
lem centers around the kinds of crimes and kinds ofpeople involved.
We approach this problem by adopting an operational definition
that considers both the offender and the offense.
We began by listing offenses against the United States Code that
might plausibly fall within the category of white-collar crimes. We
refined this list by asking United States Attorneys and Assistant
United States Attorneys in the ten districts in which we conducted
our research whether they would include or exclude the listed of-
fenses.67 We retained thirty-one offenses that elicited considerable
consensus as white-collar crimes.68 We designated the other offenses
65. Our interviews were conducted over a ten week period, with one week spent in each of
the ten districts. The ten jurisdictions comprise a purposive sample selected by the Supreme
Court (under provisions of the Speedy Trial Act, as explained in note 64 supra) and intended
to maximize the representation of major metropolitan and geographic areas across the United
States. The authors of this paper conducted the interviews together, using a set of structured,
open-ended interview schedules that are available upon request. Our purpose was to interview
a cross-section of court personnel across the ten districts. Unedited excerpts from these inter-
views are quoted in this Article. One Chief Judge refused to be interviewed and two U.S.
Attorneys were not available for interviews. However, the first Assistant to each of these U.S.
Attorneys was interviewed and our coverage otherwise was quite comprehensive.
66. See WHI CoLLAR CRIME (G. Geis & R. Meier rev. ed. 1977)
67. U. S. Attorneys were asked to identify offense codes that were almost always white-
collar, sometimes white-collar, and almost never white-collar.
68. A short description follows of these offenses, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) (antitrust violations);
18 U.S.C. §§ 152, 201, 209, 287, 643, 648, 657, 658, 664, 1001, 1005, 1006, 1010, 1012, 1014,
1341, 1342, 1343 (1976) (bankruptcy - concealment of assets, false oaths and claims, bribery;
bribery, graft, and conflicts of interest - bribery of public officials and witnesses; bribery,
graft, and conflict of interest - salary of government officials and employees payable only by
U.S.; bribery, graft, and conflict of interest - offer to procure appointed public office; claims
and services in matters affecting the government - false or fraudulent claims; embezzlement
and theft - accounting for public money, embezzlement and theft - custodians, generally,
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as common crimes.6 9 We then cross-classified white-collar crimes
and common crimes with two separate measures of the offender's
social standing: education (high school or less, and college or more)
and income (less than $13,777 and $13,777 or more, per year, in
1974-1977 dollars; this equates with a cut-off point of well over
$20,000 in 1982 dollars). These points correspond to the highest
grouping of occupations considered in recent American stratification
research.70 Similar analyses performed separately for the education
and income measures have reached substantially similar results.7'
We present here only the results involving education.72
The resulting cross-classification that forms the central part of
our analysis includes the following four kinds of cases: the common
crimes of the less educated, the common crimes of the college educated
the white-collar crimes of the less educated; and the white-collar crimes
of the college educated The last category interests us most, particu-
larly in comparison to the first, because it designates the "purest"
form of white-collar crime we can identify. We expect prosecution
and sentencing of this type of case to exhibit the most interesting
variation across jurisdictions.
In the first step of our analysis, we examined the distribution of
cases sentenced for the four offender-offense combinations in all ten
districts, as presented in Table 1 in the Appendix. The most right-
misusing public funds; embezzlement and theft - lending, credit, and insurance institutions;
embezzlement and theft - property mortgaged or pledged to farm credit agencies; embezzle-
ment and theft - theft or embezzlement from employee benefit plan; fraud and false state-
ments - statements or entries generally; fraud and false statements - bank entries, reports, or
false transactions; fraud and false statements - federal crime institutions entries, reports, and
transactions; fraud and false statements - HUD and FHA transactions; fraud and false state-
ments - loan and credit applications generally, also renewals and discounts, crop insurance;
mail fraud - frauds and swindles; mail fraud - fictitious name or address; mail fraud -
fraud by wire, radio, or television; respectively); 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7203, 7206 (1976) (attempt
to evade or defeat tax; failing to file tax return; fraud and false statements; respectively); 29
U.S.C. § 501 (1976) (fiduciary responsibility of officers of labor organizations); 38 U.S.C.
§ 3502 (1976) (fraudulent acceptance of payments - veterans' benefits). Four additional of-
fenses (18 U.S.C. § 2073 (1976); 26 U.S.C §§ 7207, 7262 (1976); 49 U.S.C. § 322 (1976)) were
designated as white-collar by U.S. Attorneys in our interviews. These offenses, however, did
not result in convictions for college educated offenders in our data.
69. See note 4, supra.
70. That is, for example, in D. FEATHERMAND & R. HAUSER, OPPORTUNITY AND CHANGE
(1978), these education and income divisions correspond to the socioeconomic classification
called "upper nonmanual," which includes the following occupational categories: self-em-
ployed and salaried professionals, managers and salesmen.
71. See Hagan, Nagel & Albonetti, The Social Organization of Mhite-Collar Sanctions: .4
Study of Prosecution and Punishment in the Federal Courts, in WHITE COLLAR AND ECONOMIC
CRIME (P. Wickman & T. Dailey eds. 1982).
72. Education was selected over income for two reasons: it allows us to consider women
without reported income in a more meaningful manner, and it avoids the problem of cor-
recting for a deflating dollar over the period of the study.
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hand column of this Table indicates that less than five percent of the
cases sentenced in these courts involve college educated persons con-
victed and sentenced for white-collar crimes, while nearly three
quarters of these cases involve less educated persons convicted and
sentenced for common crimes. Looking across the Table at the ten
districts represented in our data, we see that the distribution of cases
within districts appears, with the notable exception of District III,
rather consistent, particularly in terms of the proportion of college
educated persons sentenced for white-collar crimes.
Nearly 12 percent of the cases sentenced in District III involve
college educated persons convicted of white-collar crimes. The
figures for the remaining districts range from 2.5% to 5.4%. In other
words, District III sentences more than twice the proportionate
number of college-educated persons for white-collar crimes as do the
other districts. While District III sentences only 10.6% of the cases
handled in all ten districts, it sentences 25.5% of the white-collar
cases involving college educated persons. This implies that District
III has been considerably more active, or in other wordspro active,7 3
in its prosecution of white-collar crime than the remaining districts.
The observation of one District III U.S. Attorney effectively cap-
tured this proactive attitude: "We don't sit back and wait for cases
to walk in the door. We go out and make them."' 74 Even in District
III, however, the absolute volume of these cases sentenced remains
undramatic; only 80 college educated persons convicted for white-
collar crimes were sentenced in District III during the period consid-
ered. Nonetheless, pursuing even this number of cases probably re-
quires substantial reallocation of resources.75 Since white-collar
73. For further discussion of the proactive and reactive patterning of criminal justice, see
A. REISs, THE POLICE AND THE PUBLIC (1971); Black, The Mobilization of Law, 2 J. LEGAL
STUD. 125 (1973).
74. The statement is taken from an interview with District III prosecutors conducted pur-
suant to this study.
75. The following excerpts from interviews with three different U.S. Attorneys from our
ten districts make this point clear.
[1] It is... hard to... successfully prosecute these kinds of cases. They [U.S. Attor-
neys] shouldn't go in unless they know how to do it, and they frequently don't know how
to do it. Some of them haven't got the manpower to do it. It is a very time-consuming
kind of work, and some of these offices have five or six people who are just buried. How
are they going to free up people... ? They [have] only got six people in the offices.
[2] It would be nice to investigate let's say public corruption. "Okay, FBI, I want you to
go out and develop snitches in all the HEW places where they might be taking bribes."
... But God knows how much time [that would take], and we don't have the resources to
do that. If I had some prosecutors or some agency to whom I could say, "Okay, I don't
mind your wasting a year investigating this because we want it looked into," then I could
see doing that, but ifyou don't have the resources to do it - I just don't feel you are using
fo ur resources right.
u It is difficult - it is a very difficult process of trying to do everything that should be
done and yet still allowing yourself to free up enough resources to do the cases that are
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cases require a disproportionate investment of resources, the doub-
ling of the proportionate number of cases (albeit still not large) in
District III probably reflects a more dramatic difference than might
otherwise appear.
Returning to Table 1, we note that in none of the districts does
the conviction and sentencing of white-collar crime predominantly
involve white-collar individuals. In all of the districts, college edu-
cated persons sentenced for white-collar crimes constitute a minor-
ity. Many of these districts sentenced less educated persons more
than twice as frequently as college educated persons for white-collar
crimes. Thus, although District III again demonstrates a more
proactive emphasis on the white-collar crimes of white-collar per-
sons, this emphasis by no means excludes other offenders: While
11.6% of the offenders in this district are college educated individuals
convicted of white-collar crimes, 12.2% are convicted of white-collar
crimes but have not been college educated.76 Federal prosecutors
pursue, for example, large numbers of bank clerks for small-scale
embezzlements and less educated citizens for relatively small-scale
income tax violations.77 Conversely, college educated persons are
convicted and sentenced for common crimes. Such individuals con-
stitute 14% of those sentenced for common crimes in all ten of the
districts.
Summarizing this phase of our analysis, the most consistent find-
ing across the districts concerns the large number of cases involving
less educated persons sentenced for common crimes. District III
deviates most significantly from this pattern, with 63.7% of its cases
involving less educated persons sentenced for common crimes. The
remaining cases in this district fall fairly equally into the other three
offender-offense combinations, with the relative concentration of
cases in the white-collar crimes committed by college educated per-
sons category making this district most unique.
B. Methods and Measurement
Table 2 presents the variables considered in the analyses that fol-
more difficult and need to be done but aren't so obvious. There's always a balancing act
that is very difficult.
76. See Geis,A vocational Crime, in HANDBOOK OF CRIMINOLOoY 289 (D. Glaser ed. 1974)
("white-collar crimes can be committed by persons in all social classes"); Katz, Legality and
Equality: Plea bargaining in the Prosecution of White Collar and Common Crimes, 13 LAW &
Soc. Rnv. 431, 433 (1979) ("There are relatively few crimes that can be committed only by
those in white-collar occupations.").
77. See, eg., Long, The Internal Revenue Service: Examining the Exercise of Discretion
in Tax Enforcement (1979) (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Law and Soc. Assn.,
San Francisco).
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low. The research literature commonly regards the independent
variables in Table 2 as partially explanatory of variations in sentenc-
ing outcomes.78 This familiar list of variables includes: A number
of prior adult felony convictions, maximum prescribed statutory se-
riousness of the offense, 9 number of charges for which the defen-
dant was convicted, ethnicity, sex, age, and employment status. We
also consider treatment of the defendant for physical or mental ill-
ness. Our interviews with judges suggested that these last two vari-
ables might exert particular influence in white-collar cases. In
addition, our sensitivity to the impact of prior processing decisions
on sentencing suggested the inclusion of pretrial release status
(ordinally ranked on the basis of our interviews and on an evalua-
tion of the fiscal and personal constraints involved), and whether the
defendant pleaded guilty. The next three variables we consider
(numbers 13, 14, and 15) represent the offender-offense combina-
tions introduced earlier. The last three variables in this table, num-
bers 16, 17, and 18, are our dependent measures of sentence
outcome: the in/out decision about imprisonment, a sentence sever-
ity scale, and, for those imprisoned, the length of imprisonment as
measured in months. We include these various measures of our de-
pendent variable because the sentencing decision may have several
dimensions.80 The 'n/Out" measure responds to the initial and
most difficult decision judges regard themselves as making: whether
to send the person to prison or to impose a noncustodial sentence.8'
Our second measure, a sentence severity scale, derives from the ef-
forts of Tiffany et al. to devise an interval scale that approximates
the severity of different sentencing options.82 This scale attempts to
combine the different types and amount of sentence on a common
dimension. Third, we use a measure of the length of confinement (in
78. See, e.g., Bernstein, Kelly & Doyle, Societal Reaction to Deviants: The Case of Criminal
Defendants, 42 AM. Soc. REv. 743 (1977); Burke & Turk, FactorsAffecting Post-Arrest Disposi-
tions" A Modelfor Analys, 22 Soc. PROBs. 313 (1975); Chiricos & Waldo, Socioeconomic
Status and Criminal Sentencing: An Empirical Assessment of a Conflict Proposition, 40 AM.
Soc. Ray. 753 (1975); Hagan, Extra-LegalAttributes and Criminal Sentencing: An Assessment
0/a Sociological Viewpoint, 8 LAW & Soc. Rnv. 357 (1974); Swigert & Farrell, Normal Homi-
cides and the Law, 42 AM. Soc. Rav. 16 (1977).
79. This variable is measured in terms of the maximum prison sentence provided in the
United States Code for the charge initially placed against the offender.
80. Wheeler, Weisburd & Bode make a compelling argument for multiple sentencing
measures. See Wheeler, Weisburd & Bode, Sentencing the White-Collar Offender: Rhetoric
and Reality (unpublished manuscript, Yale Law School, 1981) (copy on file with the Michigan
Law Review).
81. See Wheeler, Weisburd & Bode, supra note 80.
82. Minimal revisions in this scale derive from our interviews and are intended to reflect
further gradations in the severity of sentences imposed.
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months) for an analysis limited to those whose sentence includes
some term of imprisonment. The factors that influence these three
distinctive outcome measures may or may not be the same. Thus,
our analysis, among other things, will compare the determinants of
these decisions.
We analyzed the data using conventional multiple regression
procedures.83 Multiple regression analysis offers the advantage of
providing precise and quantitative estimates of the effects of different
factors on a dependent variable (for example, the In/Out decision).
In multiple regression, one first specifies the major variables that are
believed to influence the dependent variable, as we have done for
sentencing decisions above.84 Relationships between the dependent
variable and the independent variables of interest are then estimated
by extracting from each the effects of the other major variables. The
regression coefficients express these "net" relationships, and offer the
best substitute available for a controlled experiment which may ma-
nipulate the values of the independent variable to determine their
influence. The results of multiple regression analyses show the ef-
fects of each independent variable on the dependent variable, while
holding the effects of other independent variables statistically con-
stant. These results also allow statements about the probability that
any effect described has occurred merely as a result of chance.
We can now indicate how we introduce our offender-offense
combinations into the analysis. Through an approach termed
dummy coding,85 we created three separate "dummy variables" to
represent three of the four categories created earlier in the cross-clas-
sification of the offender's education and offense. The omitted cate-
gory, in this instance less educated persons sentenced for common
crimes, becomes a reference point for considering the effects of the
remaining offender-offense combinations. Thus each of the dummy
variables, when included in the regressions that follow, yields a coef-
ficient that represents the differences in sentence outcome for cases
classified in the specified offender-offense groupings compared to the
83. See, eg., Finkelstein, The Judicial Reception of fultple Regression Studies in Race and
Sex Discrimination Cases, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 702 (1980); Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal
Proceedings, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 702 (1980).
84. There inevitably will remain a number of unspecified minor influences that in combi-
nation also have a nonnegligible effect on the dependent variable. These minor influences are
handled by combining them in what is referred to as a random disturbance term; their joint
effect is then assumed to be unsystematically related to the major variables being investigated.
On this point, and for a more general and excellent review of multiple regression in legal
research, see Fisher, supra note 83.
85. For a discussion of dummy coding, see F. KERLINGER & E. PEDHAZAR, MULTIPLE
REGRESSION IN BEHAvIoRAL REsEARCH 185-86 (1973).
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less educated person sentenced for common crimes grouping, with
all other variables in the regression analysis taken into account. This
approach enables us to address the issue of whether a disparity exists
in the sentences received by college educated persons sentenced for
white-collar crimes as compared to less educated persons sentenced
for common crimes, that persists after acounting for the other in-
dependent variables. This is precisely the kind of issue raised by
Sutherland's initial studies and discussed in the introduction of this
Article.
In the analyses that follow, we are presenting multiple regres-
sions for our three dependent measures of sentence outcome, first for
all ten districts taken together, second for District III, and third for
the remaining nine districts.
C. The 4naolses
Table 3 presents the results of the first part of our analyses. This
table results from regressing our three dependent measures of sen-
tence outcome on our independent variables in all ten districts taken
together.3 6 Our primary interest in these regressions concerns
whether - other variables held constant - college educated persons
are sentenced more leniently for their white-collar crimes than less
educated persons are sentenced for common crimes. For all ten dis-
tricts taken together in Table 3, there is no indication that this is the
case. The only offender-offense combination that has a significant
effect involves the months of imprisonment imposed on college edu-
cated persons sentenced for common crimes. The unstandardized
coefficient (b=6.19) for this grouping merits a very explicit interpre-
tation: on average, and with all other independent variables in this
regression held constant, college educated. persons sentenced for
common crimes who are imprisoned receive sentences more than six
months shorter than less educated persons sentenced for common
crimes. The F-value for this coefficient is 5.53, indicating that the
probability of this finding resulting from chance is less than five in
one hundred (te., this finding is statistically significant at the .05
level). This is, however, the only dependent measure of sentence
86. One of our dependent variables, the In/Out decision, is a binary, variable and there
has been some concern about the use of regression techniques in these circumstances. How-
ever, it also has been demonstrated that when the distribution of the dependent variable is not
extreme (and here the distribution is nearly perfectly balanced) that the results are substan-
tively unaffected. See Knoke,.4 Comparison ofLog-Linear and Regression Modelsfor Systems
ofDichotomous Variables, 3 Soc. METHODS & Soc. RESEARCH 416 (1975). For a discussion of
the advantages of using regression procedures in these circumstances, see Gillespie, Log-Linear
Techniques and the Regresson Analysis of Dummy Dependent Variables, 6 Soc. METHODS &
RESEARCH 103 (1977).
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outcome for which the data reveal such a disparity. No significant
difference exists for the In/Out decision, or the sentence severity
scale, and the remaining offender-offense combinations also do not
show significant disparities. Otherwise these regressions contain
some expected findings: prior convictions, statutory seriousness, and
pretrial release status produce consistently strong effects on sentence
outcome, however measured. Some indication exists that whites,
women, the employed, defendants who act alone and those who
plead guilty receive some leniency in sentencing. However, our pri-
mary interest lies with the sentencing of white-collar cases. The
question remains as to how the sentencing of these cases might vary
in terms of the district variation noted earlier.
To deal with this issue, we turn to Tables 4 and 5. Table 4
presents the regressions for District III only, the district that we iden-
tified as most proactively pursuing white-collar crime. The most
striking feature of this table, particularly in contrast to Tables 3 and
5 reflects theprevalence of white-collar effects. Both college and less
educated persons sentencedfor white-collar crimes in District III, as
indicated for all three dependent measures, receive more lenient
sentences than less educated persons sentencedfor common crimes.
College educated persons sentenced for common crimes also receive
more lenient treatment than the latter group, in terms of the sentence
severity scale and months of imprisonment, but not in terms of the
In/Out decision. All of these differences are significant at the .01
level, meaning that each would have occurred less than one in a hun-
dred times by chance. Some of these effects are quite pronounced.
For example, the average college educated person sentenced for a
white-collar crime, again with all other independent variables held
constant, receives a sentence more than two years shorter (b=
-24.31) than the average less educated person sentenced for a com-
mon crime in District III. Less educated persons sentenced for
white-collar crimes receive comparable leniency in terms of the sen-
tence severity scale and months imprisonment, and they receive even
greater leniency than college educated persons sentenced for white-
collar crimes in the In/Out decision (the appropriate comparison
here is between the B's: -. 12 and -. 22). This means that less edu-
cated persons sentenced for common crimes are more likely to go to
jail than both college and less educated persons sentenced for white-
collar crimes, but that the latter group is least likely to meet this fate
in District III.
In contrast, Table 5 indicates no significant differences for any of
the offender-offense groupings in the remaining districts. This im-
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plies that the differential sentencing of white-collar offenders may
only become apparent in those districts which pursue white-collar
crime aggressively, ie., proactively. Said differently, an inverse rela-
tionship may exist between the volume of white-collar convictions
and the severity of white-collar sentences.
SUMMARY
Our research produced four sets of findings that we consider dra-
matic and important to reiterate. First, of the 6,518 defendants sen-
tenced in our sample, only slightly less than 5% are college educated
persons convicted of white-collar crimes. Thus, despite all the recent
emphasis on the importance of cracking down on white-collar
crimes, the absolute numbers remain very small. Of the other per-
sons sentenced, 8% are less educated persons convicted of white-col-
lar crimes, 14% are college educated persons convicted of common
crimes and 73% are less educated persons convicted of common
crimes. Even aggregating all persons convicted of white-collar
crimes, the college educated and less educated together still yield
only 13% of the total convictions.
Second, of the persons convicted of white-collar crimes, the less
educated outnumber the college educated. This underscores the im-
portance we earlier attributed to varying definitions of white-collar
criminality, and especially to cross-classification of the offense with
the offender.
Third, setting aside for the moment jurisdictional comparisons,
when we consider the sentences meted out in all ten jurisdictions
taken together, controlling for all the independent variables, in addi-
tion to the white-collar of the offense and offender earlier identified,
the purest form of white-collar criminality - college educatedpersons
convicted of white-collar crimes - does not receive preferential treat-
ment in terms of the decision to incarcerate or not (the In/Out deci-
sion) nor in terms of our measure of sentence severity. This is a most
dramatic finding. Furthermore, only the category of college educated
persons convicted of common crimes receives preferential treatment.
This is only true when considering the length of sentence for those
sentenced to a period of imprisonment. College educated persons
sentenced for common crimes receive six months less time than their
less educated counterparts similarly convicted of common crimes.
At least for those convicted of common crimes, a college education
appears to have some positive benefit.
Fourth, the possibility of jurisdictional variation produces sub-
stantial departures from these results in District III. District III had a
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higher rate of sentencing of college educated persons convicted of
white-collar crimes than all other nine districts. In fact, of all the
college educated persons convicted of white-collar crimes across the
ten districts, 25% were convicted and sentenced in District III, even
though District III did not have the largest case base of the ten
districts.
In District III, unlike the case for all ten districts considered to-
gether, persons convicted of white-collar crimes, whether college ed-
ucated or not, fared better in sentencing outcomes than those
convicted of common crimes, especially the less educated convicted
of common crimes. The advantage of the less educated persons con-
victed of white-collar crimes becomes pronounced when considering
the decision to imprison or not. Finally, persons convicted of white-
collar crimes, in District III, whether college educated or not, re-
ceived sentences more than two years shorter (24 + months) than the
average term of imprisonment for the less educated person convicted
of common crimes.
Three potential explanations may provide some insight into these
findings. First, with respect to our finding of no preferential treat-
ment for both college and less educated persons sentenced for white-
collar crimes, across the ten jurisdictions, differences in the time, ef-
fort, and care in the prosecution of these cases may result in only the
most egregious offenses of the most culpable offenders coming to the
sentencing stage.87 Preferential treatment may occur at the earlier
processing stages, but once the most serious offenders and offenses
have been weeded out, the courts treat those remaining like all other
cases.
Second, with respect to the marked contrast noted for District III,
we have argued elsewhere that a highly proactive attitude toward the
prosecution of white-collar crime may lead to a higher rate of con-
viction coupled with a pattern of sentence leniency.88 We explain
this by emphasizing that white-collar cases present special eviden-
tiary problems and often involve multiple defendants, some of whom
may testify for the state. In the bargaining for testimony, the govern-
ment may exchange sentence leniency for needed evidence.
Third, our interviews with judges and United States Attorneys in
District III lead to the identification of several factors that might
contribute to increased convictions and lighter sentences. These fac-
tors include expanded manpower enabling more numerous prosecu-
87. See notes 52-55 supra and accompanying text.
88. Hagan, Nagel & Albonetti, The DierentialSentencing of hIite-Collar Offenders in Ten
Federal District Courts, 45 AM. Soc. RPv. 802, 818 (1980).
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tions; a deliberate emphasis by the U.S. Attorney on public
corruption, and sophisticated trial lawyers working closely with
other law enforcement agencies.89 Judges in District III expressed
considerable sentiment against imprisoning white-collar offenders,
emphasizing many of the arguments for leniency that elsewhere
evoke a greater skepticism. 90 Preferential sentencing appears to be
the price paid for expanded prosecution of white-collar crime.
CONCLUSION
Researchers and judges generally presume that white-collar
crime is preferentially treated. This assumption pervades the calls
for policy reform that repeatedly have sought to reduce sentencing
89. Since there were no published data or descriptive research to help us illuminate the
reasons for the uniqueness of District III, we posed the question to the judges and the United
States Attorneys of this District. From some Assistant United States Attorneys we learned:
[1] "Before 1971, our office was sorely understaffed. When X took office, we doubled in
size. Since then we have doubled again. As our manpower increased, so did our potential
for proactive prosecution."
[2] "We wanted to become the best United States Attorneys office in the country. It was a
feeling, an attitude, that we are going to be the best, regardless of other districts."
[3] "Official corruption cases can't just be found. They have to be there but you have to
go out and find them."
[4] "X (U.S. Attorney) made the pursuit of official corruption and white-collar crime our
top priority. We put aside the attitude that public officials and white-collar criminals
should be left alone after allegations."
[5] 'We had good relations here with the Strike Force. . . . Our postal inspectors were
more receptive to help investigators."
90. From interviews with some judges in District In we learned:
[1] 'We were suffering from a collective prosecutorial guilt about our inattention to
white-collar crimes."
[2] "The Justice Department saw a sophisticated judiciary here and an attitude of trust-
busterism."
[3] "Our judges are not going to wink away anti-trust cases. We love them.., we find
them challenging."
As to why the jurisdiction produces a high rate of convictions coupled with a pattern of prefer-
ential treatment at sentencing for white-collar criminality, the judges suggested-
[1] "The white-collar offender can do community service.. . the postal guy stealing
watches, what can he teach?"
[2] "A badge of guilt is enough for a white-collar offender. He doesnt need jail. A badge
of guilt doesn't, however, punish the nonwhite-collar offender."
[3] "I start with probation. Jail is for violence, harm done to others, danger to hard
working people. I identify with the victim. But also know the ramifications of punish-
ment for establishment persons.'
[4] "If you give a white-collar guy a long sentence and he goes to the wrong place, he
can't cope. They'll totally destroy the guy. The lower class, especially the recidivist, he
can cope."
And finally, linking the preference for tough prosecution and modest sentences, one judge
said:
In blue-collar cases, you go after the defendant. In white-collar cases, you're after the
system - the industry - the defendant may be less important. The sentence may be less
critical than the processing - the prosecution. The publicity of the prosecution may
achieve the desired impact. You don't need quite the Greek tragedy of a whole viking
funeral
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disparities.9' Yet, with the exception of only one of the ten jurisdic-
tions studied, we do not find empirical support for this long standing
assumption. We are not prepared to argue that the problem of sen-
tence disparity for white-collar crime is trivial or imaginary. At the
same time, we are not prepared to affirm the proposition that persons
convicted of white-collar offenses uniformly receive preferential
treatment in sentencing. Our research suggests a complex pattern,
tied, in some ways, to the pattern of prosecution. While we do report
some evidence of preferential sentencing of persons convicted of
white-collar crimes, this pattern appears only in one federal district,
the same district distinguished by its proactive prosecutorial policy
toward white-collar crime and its resultant greater number of white-
collar convictions. There is an absence of clear evidence of sentence
disparity in the other nine districts. This evidence may suggest the
need to rethink some of the assumptions behind the contemporary
critique of white-collar criminal sentencing, as well as the policy pro-
posals that critique has engendered.
We leave the question for the future whether this reflects an effort
to correct prior sentence leniency for persons convicted of white-col-
lar crimes, a temporary accommodation to the Watergate scandal, or
the beginning of a major trend. Additional research will help to
clarify these persistent questions. We offer this study as a foundation
for the work to come.
91. As early as 1877, reformers had called for explicit standards to minimize sentencing
disparities. See E. Cox, PRINCIPLES OF PUNISHMENT AS APPLIED IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF
THE CRIMINAL LAW BY JUDGES AND MAGISTRATES (1877). Contemporary reformers have
renewed the attack on sentence disparities. See, e.g., M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES
(1973); Coffee, The Revressed Issues ofSentencing: Accountability, Predictability and Equality
in the Era of the Sentencing Commission, 66 GEo. L.J. 975 (1978); Kaufman, The Sentencing
Views of Yet.4nother Judge, 66 GEO. L.J. 1247 (1978).
The reformers' antipathy to presumed sentencing disparities found legislative expression in
the various efforts to codify the federal criminal law. In particular, the compromise codifica-
tion bill that passed the Senate, S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), included a number of
provisions designed to reduce sentence disparities and made particular provisions for white
collar criminal sentencing. See 124 CONG. Rac. S860 (1978) for the Senate's approval. The
bill, however, never became law.
Specifically, the bill included a Sentencing Commission to recommend appropriate, deter-
minate sentences for various categories of offenses. Judges who imposed a sentence other than
that which the Commission's guidelines recommended would have to state their reason for this
deviation, and their decision and its rationale would be subject to appellate review. See S.
REP. No. 605, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 922 (1977); S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2003(b), 3725
(1977). The findings reported here suggest that the assumption of significant sentencing dis-
parities underlying such proposals should not be casually adopted.
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